

ADMIRAL STANSFIELD TURNER

6 JUL 1977

Dear Vince,

Although it's probably old hat to you, I thought I'd send along the attached material on the Naval Reserve which the CNO recently circulated.

STAT In addition, I have to correct an error that [] and I gave you regarding the possibility of my speaking in Lexington. I simply had the months mixed up. It is November 11th that I am going to be at DePauw and Wabash. This makes it appear to me that it would conflict with the speaker you already have engaged for your November exercise -- we'll find something else later on I'm sure.

Again, thanks for all your support. The battle goes on!

Yours,



STANSFIELD TURNER

Enclosure

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THE UNITED STATES NAVAL RESERVE

During recent years, the Congress and the Administration have differed substantially in their positions concerning the size and use of the Naval Reserve.

On 21 May, I received a letter from Senators Bob Dole, Charles McC. Mathias, Jr. and Sam Nunn which asked for my personal view, as CNO, on the military missions, requirements and considerations which bear on the Naval Reserve's peacetime missions and mobilization requirements.

The following is the text of the Senators' letter:

"We are increasingly concerned about the continuing issues related to the United States Naval Reserve. As you know, there has been over the past three years considerable debate within both the Department of Defense and in the Congress concerning the size of the Naval Reserve and how this organization can best serve the security interest of the United States.

"This letter is to bring to your attention our interest in your assessment of two distinct areas of interest to the Senate, as pointed out during the recent floor debate on the DOD Authorization Bill for Fiscal Year 1978. These two areas include the peacetime missions assigned to the Naval Reserve and the distinct and identifiable mobilization requirements which the Naval Reserve must be prepared to meet.

"This letter is to request that you provide us with your own view, as Chief of Naval Operations, of the military missions, requirements, and considerations which bear on the two principal areas of our concern. We ask that you give your personal attention to this matter. It will be helpful to us if your response can be received prior to the meeting of the Joint House/Senate Committee on the DOD Authorization Bill."

On 3 June, I sent Senators Dole, Mathias and Nunn the following response:

"This is in response to your letter of 21 May 1977, which expressed your concern over the continuing issues related to the United States Naval Reserve. The purpose of my response is to provide you with my own view as Chief of Naval Operations on the military missions, requirements and considerations which bear on the peacetime missions assigned to the Naval Reserve and the distinct and identifiable mobilization requirements which the Naval Reserve must be prepared to meet.

"I am particularly pleased to be able to respond to you on this subject because it is one to which I have given a great deal of my personal attention. Shortly after assuming the position of Chief of Naval Operations in the summer of 1974, I became concerned with the mobilization potential of the United States Naval Reserve, and became convinced that circumstances had been so altered over the recent years that a reexamination of the missions and structure of the Naval Reserve was not only indicated, but mandatory. The altered conditions to which I refer are as follows. After World War II, the nation possessed a powerful inventory of ships lying in reserve in mothball fleets and many aircraft stored in dehumidified containers or in the desert. Our reserve concept had been that, in time of mobilization, these mothballed forces would be reactivated and manned primarily by the personnel available from the Naval Reserve. As a matter of fact, this was done during the Korean War to substantially expand the size of the active Navy. However, today the inventory of stored ships and aircraft has virtually been exhausted. What few ships remain are not capable of meeting the first line threat of hostile weapons technology and, in fact, most would require years of refurbishment simply to get to sea.

"It became clear that the United States Navy would have to fight the next war with the ships, aircraft and weapons systems in-being and that there were no reserves of mothballed equipment available. The Naval Reserve began to restructure in this direction in 1973.

"Further, it was clear to me that the United States Naval Reserve represented an enormous reservoir of

skills in talented, dedicated, and patriotic men and women who were willing and potentially ready to fight in the defense of their country in time of war.

"Therefore, I decided that a definitive current policy which would address the requirements, employment and organization of the Naval Reserve needed to be developed. As a result, the Chief of Naval Operations Policy Statement on the U.S. Naval Reserve was issued in October of 1974. This policy viewed the Naval Reserve as an integral part of the Navy total force which would contribute to the overall security of the country. As a part of the United States Navy, the United States Naval Reserve must contribute to the Navy's mission, which is spelled out succinctly in Title 10, U.S. Code. To this end, the U.S. Naval Reserve must be integrated into the U.S. Navy and must assist in fulfilling the Department of the Navy's requirements to perform its mission.

"Naval force requirements are determined by the national military strategy, the threat involved in the execution of that strategy, and the degree of risk that is deemed acceptable in carrying out that strategy. Our national military strategy today is well defined and can be best described as a forward strategy; one in which the oceans are used as barriers in the defense of our nation and as avenues for extending our interests and projecting our influence abroad. This forward strategy imposes three principal roles upon the Navy: 1) to provide the invulnerable segment of the nuclear strategic deterrent in the FBM forces; 2) to provide the naval component of overseas deployed U.S. forces; 3) to protect the sea lines of communication between the United States and our own forces and our allies located overseas. In order to fulfill these roles, the U.S. Navy must maintain a steady-state peacetime posture of about 30% of the active fleet deployed overseas, and about 40% combat-ready, operating in the vicinity of their homeports, prepared for immediate deployment to reinforce or to react to the eruption of warfare or crisis. The remaining 30% of the active fleet is engaged in modernization, basic training and preventive maintenance to prepare them for the combat ready status.

"The roles and posture of the U.S. Navy, as described in the foregoing, constitute the basic considerations which led to the structure of a Naval Reserve designated to support the Navy's mission, functions and roles. A principal consideration is that the Naval Reserve is generally not available to the Navy except during periods of mobilization or when the 50,000 limited recall feature is exercised.

"Based upon the mission, functions, roles and deployment posture of the U.S. Navy, and the considerations of mobilization limitations, the missions of the United States Naval Reserve visualized by the CNO's Naval Reserve Policy evolved into two basic categories:

- Naval Reserve Force ships, aircraft squadrons, and other units with assigned organic equipment.

- Naval Reserve elements used to augment active force ships, aircraft squadrons, staffs and shore facilities to permit the operation of these organizations under combat alert conditions on a 24 hour-per-day basis for the sustained period of time that general warfare demands.

"Based upon the available ships, aircraft, and equipment for Naval Reserve units; and the size, structure, and active duty manning levels of the active fleet and shore activities, a study of total Naval Reserve requirements was undertaken.

"This study was conducted in the immediate staff of the Chief of Naval Operations under the direction of the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Plans, Policy, and Operations, and involved the full participation of the Fleet Commanders and other manpower claimants and sponsors. The purpose of conducting the study in such an environment was to insure that the Naval Reserve missions were completely integrated into the mission of the U.S. Navy and the total force requirements of the Navy to support that mission. The study was actually conducted by Naval Reserve and regular Navy officers all operating in the top level of the U.S. Navy's plans, policy, and operations staff organization. The results of the study, which was completed in 1975, showed a projected requirement for 102,000 Selected Reservists in 1977.

This effort has continued, and a similar review, now being completed, indicates a requirement for about 100,000 Selected Reservists in 1978. The drop in number reflects our declining active fleet and Naval Reserve airlift force levels.

"Concerning the peacetime missions assigned to the Naval Reserve, it should be kept in mind that Reservists are available for fulltime duty only upon call-up, either through general mobilization or within the 50,000 Presidential contingency recall authority. Moreover, Selected Reservists do drill monthly and serve annually. I view this as necessary in order to maintain their technical proficiency. Therefore, it is possible in peacetime, under non-mobilization conditions, to utilize Selected Reservists in a significant way, contributing to the peacetime posture and operations of United States Naval forces. Some ways in which Selected Reservists are used are:

- airlift operations
- intelligence analysis and production
- air terminal cargo and passenger handling
- SEABEE construction projects
- ship and aircraft maintenance
- command and operations centers watches
- communications center watches
- support to active Navy commands in such fields as legal, religious, and medical assistance in local areas.

"I have assigned the Chief of Naval Reserve as my Executive Agent for airlift operations. His staff and mine are studying the best means of implementing the plan to transfer the continental United States airlift mission and the associated transport aircraft to the Naval Reserve within two years.

"The 100,000 billets defined by the OP-605 review for FY 1978 provide the Selected Reserve manpower for 57

reserve ships, 43 reserve aircraft squadrons, 2 riverine squadrons, 6 cargo handling battalions, 17 construction battalions, plus urgent and essential mobilization augmentation to permit 282 ships, 120 aircraft squadrons, 352 shore stations, 150 staffs and 888 other activities to operate under wartime conditions of alert, on a 24 hour-per-day basis, for the unlimited period of time required by general war. An additional 200,000 billets need to be filled during the first three months of a war from the Individual Ready Reserve, Standby Reserve, retirees and new accessions.

"I recognize that the 100,000 Selected Reserve billet requirements represent just that--our estimate of our requirements in this area--and that Naval requirements are not being met in many other areas due to limitations of fiscal resources. Similarly, the degree to which the Naval Reserve billet requirements are not met is reflected in a corresponding reduction in total Navy force capability. There remains then the very fine element of judgment as to how much of our limited fiscal resources should be applied to be able to utilize the talent, dedication, and potential that resides in the men and women of the United States Naval Reserve. Understandably, the judgment as to the fraction of the total Naval Reserve requirement that is met must be kept in balance with our other requirements and with the total force structure of the Navy and overall national security considerations.

"In summary, I can say that the United States Navy does have a very firm and current policy for the maximum exploitation of the talent available in the Naval Reserve; that the plans for this utilization are based upon mobilization situations; that a very definite peacetime benefit is attained by utilizing the Naval Reserve organization even though it is based mainly on call-up considerations; that 100,000 Selected Reserve billets have been identified, and that all of these validated billets represent a significant contribution to the total force capability of the United States Navy in carrying

out its mission and functions, and fulfilling its tasks in the case of general war."

The texts of the foregoing letters are provided to you both for information and to assist you in responding to questions you may receive concerning the Navy's position on the size, use and contribution of the Naval Reserve.